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BLACK BOXES AND OPEN SECRETS: 
TRILOGUES AS ‘POLITICIZED DIPLOMACY’ 
 
Abstract How can we explain the puzzling contrast between formal rules of open EU 
lawmaking and the practice of secluded trilogues? This question, arising against growing public 
controversy, points to a blind spot in the scholarly agenda on trilogues, which has overwhelmingly 
focused on their internal games. Drawing on the interpretivist tradition, we argue that rules are 
shaped by tradition and the dilemmas arising from conflicting beliefs and lived experiences. On this 
basis and drawing on extensive interview material, we argue that: 1) the vagaries of EU lawmaking 
can best be understood through the concept of ‘politicized diplomacy’; 2) a new tradition arose in 
support of seclusion, around the core belief of protecting the ‘space to think’; and 3) 
institutionalized contradictions, together with ideological tensions and ambiguous lessons from the 
lived experience of EU lawmakers have turned trilogues into a permeable institution, while 
prompting renewed public demands for transparency.  
 
Keywords: ordinary legislative procedure; trilogues; seclusion; interpretive research; politicized 
diplomacy 
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INTRODUCTION 
This article takes its point of departure in a puzzling contrast in the current EU legislative process. 
On the one hand, the successive treaties establishing the Ordinary Legislative Procedure (OLP) as 
the normal legislative process highlight the idea of open lawmaking at its core. On the other hand, a 
significant part of EU lawmaking in practice takes place in secluded arenas (Novak and Hillebrandt 
2019; Hillebrandt and Novak 2016), with the so-called legislative trilogues at the pinnacle of the 
legislative process. Trilogues are in camera negotiations between representatives of the European 
Parliament (EP), Council, and Commission. While they have no reference in the treaties, trilogues 
are now the ‘new normal’ of EU lawmaking, used at all phases of the ordinary legislative 
procedures and across a very broad spectrum of issues as a way of reaching legislative 
compromises.  
This contrast now forms the theme of a rapidly growing public conversation involving: 1) the 
European Ombudsman’s own-inquiry into the transparency of trilogues, initiated in 2015 (European 
Ombudsman 2018); and 2) the March 2018 ruling of the Court of Justice of the EU on the De 
Capitani case (General Court of the European Union 2018: Case T-540/15) annulling a decision of 
the EP to refuse to grant Mr Emilio De Capitani, an EP administrator, full access to trilogue 
documents. The Court ruling recognized trilogues as a decisive part of the EU legislative process, 
contrary to what Council had maintained. Both the Ombudsman and the Court pinpointed 
problematic features of the current trilogue process, specifically: 1) the lack of public information 
regarding the trilogue meetings, agendas, participants, documents, and decisions; and, underpinning 
this, 2) the EU institutions’ very restrictive interpretation of the principles of publicity and 
transparency in trilogues, amounting to a problematic ‘general presumption of non-disclosure’ 
(General Court of the European Union 2018). EU lawmaking institutions have yet to implement the 
Court’s ruling and the Ombudsman’s recommendations.  
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In this article, we ask: Why do EU actors promote secluded and informal fora of decision-
making even as they have committed themselves to open and public lawmaking (Novak, 2013)? 
How do they perceive and reconcile the tension between the practice of EU lawmaking and the 
democratic values of their institution? And how do they cope with challenges and dilemmas arising 
from such a situation in practice?   
To shed light on these questions, we turn to interpretivism, an approach still largely 
overlooked in the field of EU studies (Dietz 2015; but see Heinelt and Münch 2018), which is a 
mystery given its relevance for the study of informal processes and governance (Finlayson 2004). 
Interpretivism’s appeal to us is twofold. First, interpretive reasoning, at least in some of its variants, 
is puzzle-led; it ‘begins with a puzzle, a surprise, or a tension’, which it then seeks to elucidate by 
asking: ‘what circumstances would render [this] event, … word, … relationship, or whatever else 
one is seeking to explain more “commonsensical”--less surprising, less puzzling’ (Schwartz-Shea 
and Yanow 2012, 27). This emphasis helps us maintain analytic attention on what is strange, and 
therefore in need of an explanation, in the process of EU lawmaking even as we become familiar 
with it. This is critically important not only for the scholarly community, and researchers’ duty to 
speak truth to power, but also for ordinary people, for whom EU politics and processes often do not 
make sense and need to be elucidated.   
Second, in chasing these puzzles, interpretivists single themselves out by ascribing a 
considerable importance to meanings in individual and collective endeavors. Their central 
contribution is that ‘to understand actions, practices and institutions, we need to grasp the relevant 
meanings, beliefs and preferences of the people involved’ (Bevir and Rhodes 2004, 130). This 
emphasis is particularly useful to us given our interest in understanding actors’ perceptions and 
sense-making. Our contention is that paying more attention to meanings and beliefs helps us 
elucidate the puzzle of EU lawmaking. 
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Importantly, paying attention to beliefs does not mean that researchers are ‘simple conduits of 
research participants’ concepts’, or that they are ‘merely describing the social and political worlds’ 
(Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012, 39). What it does mean, instead, is that researchers engage in a 
‘world-making’ activity, in which actor’s beliefs take the drivers’ seat. This makes their research a 
‘scholarly, political act of persuasion that requires careful attention to the many elements it can (or 
should) contain which produce a trustworthy research study’ (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012, 39).  
Accordingly, our aim in this article is to produce a trustworthy interpretation of trilogue 
seclusion helping us elucidate the puzzle of EU lawmaking spelled out at the beginning of this 
introduction. We proceed in four steps. First, we take stock of the literature on trilogues with a view 
to developing an initial understanding of the issues connected to trilogue seclusion: this part 
highlights the democratic ambiguities of trilogues. Second, we spell out the conceptual 
underpinnings of our interpretive approach, emphasizing the explanatory concepts of ‘tradition’, 
‘dilemmas’, and ‘narratives’. Third, we provide key information about our methodology of ‘soaking 
and poaking’. Finally, we develop our interpretation of EU lawmaking as politicized diplomacy.   
 
DEMOCRATIC AMBIGUITIES OF TRILOGUES 
There is a growing literature on trilogues. This literature has contributed rich insights into the 
phenomenon of trilogues. Our initial understanding of trilogue seclusion is shaped by two main 
debates in this literature, both framed in a democratic perspective. The first debate focuses on the 
‘efficiency-transparency trade-off’ (Héritier and Reh 2012; Novak and Hillebrandt 2019). It is 
embedded in a view of the lawmaking parties, particularly Council, as motivated by the goal of 
reducing transaction costs, following the legislative empowerment of the EP in the consecutive 
treaties of the 1990s, starting with the Maastricht Treaty. Trilogues are a form that suits the Council 
well because it can speed up the process, the argument goes. At the heart of this debate is whether 
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trilogues actually have paved the way for a more efficacious process, and whether this has taken 
place at the expense of transparency (Stasavage 2004; Settembri 2005; Novak and Hillebrandt 
2019). Evidence shows some efficiency gains: in the lifetime of trilogues, the EU has not only 
legislated more on a broader range of issues, it has also increasingly used first-reading agreements 
or early second-reading agreements (Reh et al 2013; Dionigi and Koop 2017)--all of this thanks to 
the flexible form of trilogues, as an informal and secluded process. The literature also shows that 
trilogues have been a source of opacity in the EU legislative process, for reasons ranging from: 
characteristics of trilogue themselves (no or little public information on trilogue proceedings), to 
features of trilogue preparatory bodies in the respective lawmakers, through composition effects due 
to the superimposition of trilogues and first-reading agreements (see Table 1).  
 
Insert table 1 here 
 
The second big debate focuses on how trilogue seclusion affects the accountability of EU 
lawmakers. Researchers have argued that, by empowering a narrow set of actors in the respective 
lawmaking institutions, trilogues give these actors incentives to develop opportunistic behavior. 
This claim, known as the ‘relais actor empowerment’ thesis (Farrell and Héritier 2004), has two 
implications: it implies a loss of accountability insofar as pivotal actors in the Council and the EP 
were able to manipulate information and eschew monitoring from their respective constituencies; it 
also implies a loss of inclusiveness since smaller parties in the EP were marginalized or even 
excluded from the political negotiations. This thesis, however, probably better reflects the early 
years of trilogues, when the advent of early agreements had ‘accelerated the informalization of 
relations between Council and Parliament’ (Farrell and Héritier 2004, 1198), than recent practice. 
Trilogues have gone through a considerable institutionalization, going from largely ad hoc 
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negotiations, centered on critical bilateral contacts between the EP rapporteur and the Council 
presidency, to institutionalized negotiations, embedded in a de jure multilateral format at all stages 
of the negotiations in the EP, and following a more predictable script of EP-Council interactions 
(Roederer-Rynning and Greenwood 2015 and 2017). There are also more extensive requirements 
for reporting back to institutional constituencies, if not always through public channels (Brandsma 
2018). This reduces the risk of opportunistic behavior, which is why it has been difficult to find 
evidence in support of the relais actor thesis (Costello and Thomson 2011; Rasmussen and Reh 
2013; Brandsma 2015). 
In sum, trilogues have become an important theme in the scholarly debate on the EU 
lawmaking process, and research shows that their contribution to the EU’s democratic quality is 
ambiguous. In part, the assessment of the democratic contribution of trilogues is related to how one 
weighs the role of input and output in democratic legitimacy (Scharpf 2003; Schmidt 2013). Those 
highlighting output legitimacy find in the trilogue process a positive contribution since it has 
contributed to a more efficient lawmaking process. Conversely, those highlighting political 
participation find the trilogue process problematic given that it is secluded and it renders the EU 
lawmaking process invisible to the broader public. Looking into the organization of the process 
itself (throughput legitimacy), the research findings are ambiguous, too, depending on what 
attribute of throughput legitimacy one focuses on (Schmidt 2013). If one focuses on transparency, 
there is no question that trilogues have been detrimental to democracy. We have identified four 
ways in which they contribute to the opacity of EU lawmaking (see Table 1). If one focuses on 
accountability, instead, we cannot draw such general and simple conclusion for the issue of 
accountability because the institutionalization of trilogues, at least in the EP, has promoted a more 
inclusive and rule-like process--even though discrepancies between public commitments and 
practice exist (Brandsma 2018). We know very little on the Council side.  
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AN INTERPRETIVE APPROACH 
Discrepancies between formal rules and practices are not unique to the EU. In an insightful 
interpretation of the role of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in the global trading system, 
Wolfe (2005) argued that the WTO ‘may be “rule-based”, but officials do not “make” the rules; 
participants in the trading system make the rules’ (Wolfe 2005, 340). To understand the rule-based 
character of the WTO, the most important piece of information, he argued, is ‘not the WTO treaty 
or the decisions of the Appellate Body’ but ‘the way in which traders think about reciptocity and 
non-discrimination’ (Wolfe 2005, 340). Similarly, in the EU, where it is common to view Lisbon’s 
OLP as an integral part of ‘a rule-based logic’ of EU lawmaking, it would be naive to expect that 
the practice of EU lawmaking is identical to formal Treaty rules. The rule-based quality of EU 
lawmaking system is to be probed in the daily life, from the way participants puzzle out the 
meaning of their actions and seek to find concrete solutions to concrete dilemmas. The interesting 
question to analyze is thus not whether there is a discrepancy between formal rules and practice, but 
rather how, in concrete dilemmas or ‘problem-situations’, EU lawmaking participants encounter 
‘treaty rules’ and decide, more or less consciously and rationally, and by drawing on prior webs of 
beliefs, ‘that a certain amount of variance around the central limit is acceptable’ (Wolfe 2005, 348; 
drawing on Chayes and Chayes 1995, 26-7).  
What makes the EU different from other organizations (such as the WTO), however, is its 
hybrid and novel institutional character. Observers have drawn attention to this ‘fact’ since the 
1980s (Wallace 1983). The novelty of the EU results from the merger of different, and to a great 
extent competing, paradigms of political order. This merger is a ‘living’ process combining 
accommodation and domination; and it often manifests itself in institutionalized contradictions. Our 
argument is that these institutionalized contradictions permeate the EU lawmaking process, just as 
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they permeate individual EU institutions and organizations (see for example Christiansen 1997 on 
the European Commission; see Lewis 2003 on the Council of Ministers; see Christiansen and 
Neuhold 2013), and that the search for answers to these contradictions gives rise to organizational 
dynamics that are unforeseen.   
In the remainder of the article, we develop an interpretation (or ‘world-making’ 
reconstruction) of trilogues as politicized diplomacy in an actor-based interpretive analysis (Bevir 
and Rhodes 2015). Our approach is very much in line with recent calls within the institutionalist 
scholarship to bring back in the role of actors and agency into constructivist or sociological 
accounts of EU institutions and processes (Jenson and Mérand 2010; Ripoll Servent and Busby 
2013; Saurugger 2013 and 2016). We borrow from Bevir and Rhodes (2015) to specify what this 
means, both in terms of the worldview underpinning our analysis and in terms of the explanatory 
tools of ‘world-making’.  
Concerning the worldview underlying the analysis or the ontological premises of the analysis, 
our main assumption is that individuals are shaped by their context while also being able to 
transform them (situated agency). This is possible because, while never experiencing social reality 
from a ‘pure’ perspective free from priori beliefs, individuals develop their own interpretation of 
common beliefs and norms, and can change their beliefs and meanings through experience and their 
reflexive capacity. The corollary of this is the assumption that reasoning is always contextual-- or 
‘local’--in the sense that reasoning ‘occurs in the context of agents’ existing webs of beliefs’ (local 
reasoning) (Bevir and Rhodes 2015, 15). Together, the assumptions of situated agency and local 
reasoning suggest that a lot of social activity can be expected to cluster in regular and stable 
patterns of actions, which are labelled ‘practices’. Practices are somewhere between institutions and 
actions. They are less constraining and more flexible than institutions, which are larger and more 
constraining structures; and they are more stable than actions, which are individual and blend 
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beliefs together with individual motivations (Bevir and Rhodes 2015, 15).  
As for explanatory concepts, we are engaging in a form of explanation, which relies on the 
crafting of ‘narratives’. Narratives are ‘a form of explanation appropriate to an interpretive theory 
of politics’, which ‘work[s] by relating actions to the beliefs and desires that produce them and by 
situating these beliefs and desires in particular historical contexts’ (Bevir and Rhodes 2015, 17). 
Narratives are both concrete, historical, and realist in the sense that: they are embedded in concrete 
situations, show the connections between beliefs and actions in time, and typically aim at producing 
a fine-grained picture of what is happening. A particularly interesting moment in interpretive 
narratives is the moment of change. From an actor-centered perspective, change can be interprested 
as the result of a confrontation between ‘tradition’, i.e., the received set of beliefs, and actors’ lived 
experience (filtered by these beliefs). This confrontation culminates in ‘dilemmas’, which actors 
can resolve by reassessing their beliefs and changing their strategies. Dilemmas are ‘any experience 
or idea that conflicts with someone’s beliefs and so forces them to alter the beliefs they inherit as a 
tradition’ (Bevir and Rhodes 2015, 17).  
 
SOAKING AND POKING 
Interpretive analysis requires a great deal of what Fenno (1978) once called ‘soaking and poking’. 
Ideally, we would have soaked and poaked in the world of trilogues by participating and observing, 
but this is not possible given the in camera setting of the negotiations and our status as ‘outsiders’. 
Our access to sources is through interviews with trilogue participants: we use a form of interview, 
which is sometimes called ‘ethnographic’ (Spradley 1979) or ‘conversational’ (Rubow 2003). 
Unlike other types of interviews, such interviews are relatively long and aim at bringing the 
‘implicit’ to the surface. Unlike ordinary life conversations, the ethnographic interview is a 
concentrated and focused conversation, and it is more asymmetric ‘because the interviewees’ story 
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is at the center’ (Rubow 2003, 235). The interviewee is both a ‘native speaker’ and an ‘informant’, 
as we aim to become conversant in the language of trilogues as well as acquire specific pieces of 
information (Spradley 1979, 25; see also Rubow 2003, 239). For example, we use interviews to 
understand how much variation there is between the logic of public lawmaking and the practice of 
seclusion (interviewee as informant); but also how participants decide what deviation between 
formal rules and informal practice is acceptable (native speaker). Given the rather sensitive topic 
and the risk of manipulation, a high number of interviews is a definite advantage, since its gives us 
a better sense of regularities and variation and more possibilities for cross-checking content. Our 
interviews typically started by identifying the position, and experience with trilogue files, and then 
seeking to understand how actors keep track of the trilogue negotiations, and whether a surprise had 
ever been encountered.  It then looked in detail at trilogue mechanisms in each of the EU 
institutions, and how organized civil society actors engage with the process.  Finally, we sought to 
understand why we have the system of trilogues, and to go through cases which illustrated aspects 
of the trilogue process.   
Specifically, we carried out 86 in-depth interviews, of which 82 were conducted in Brussels 
and four in Strasbourg (see Table 2 here). 31 interviews were conducted jointly, which gave us the 
possibility to exchange reflections, discuss themes and puzzling information, and formulate follow-
up questions. All interviewees were guaranteed anonymity. Our interviewees fell in two groups: 
‘insiders’, who attend trilogues and meetings of trilogue preparatory bodies; ‘outsiders’ or civil 
society actors in the broadest sense, who do not attend trilogues or meetings of the preparatory 
bodies, but whom we know from the extensive EU policy literature that they are a key part of the 
policy-making process and are often considered as a proxy for broader societal interests.  
Insert Table 2 here 
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We did not audio-record the interviews. Given the sensitive nature of trilogue negotiations, 
audio-recording would have prevented open and detailed conversations on the topic. Audio-
recording and verbatim transcriptions are also very time-consuming, and, given the number of 
interviews that we planned to conduct, this would have delayed the process of data analysis, and 
removed us unduly from the fieldwork.  
In line with the qualitative method guidelines (Loubere 2017; Vogel and Funck 2017), 
however, we documented each interview with the help of detailed interview minutes, which we 
computer-typed during the interviews. Where we jointly interviewed, we thus had two sets of 
minutes on which to base our interpretations. The entire interview material (minutes) was then 
subject to a three-step process of data reduction and analysis which we describe, together with 
interview selection and access. This process is critically important given the richness and 
complexity of the data material. For further methodological detail, please consult the appendix at 
the end of this article.  
  
TRILOGUES AS ‘POLITICIZED DIPLOMACY’ 
A consensus exists across Council and the EP in support of trilogues. In this section, we explore the 
beliefs upon which this consensus rests, the dilemmas it engenders, as well as the practices which 
have developed as a result of these contradictions. This explanatory narrative is encapsulated in the 
concept of ‘politicized diplomacy’. Politicized diplomacy is poised between the diplomatic and 
parliamentary traditions of politics, and it is shaped in practice by a permanent flow of exchanges 
between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’.  
 
A tradition arises  
Trilogues are underpinned by a merger between different traditions of politics and political 
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conflict resolution, and therefore also rest upon different justifications. In the Council, seclusion is 
justified in light of three main beliefs: first, the belief that, without trilogues, the formal procedures 
would take too much time (efficiency); second, the belief that trilogues are a key device for 
neutralizing EP politics (depoliticization); and finally, the belief that, without trilogues, 
compromises could not be hammered out (space to think; Hillebrandt and Novak 2016). In the EP, 
likewise, seclusion is justified in light of two main beliefs: first, the belief, without trilogues, the EP 
would yield less power over EU legislation (empowerment); and second, the belief that, without 
trilogues, it would be difficult to conduct real negotiations (space to think). These beliefs are spelled 
out in greater detail in display form (see Figure 1). Extensive interview referencing can be found in 
the figure directly in the numbers in parentheses at the end of each sentence. 
 
Insert Figure 1 here 
 
There are three main insights to be derived from this list. First, a ‘tradition’ of seclusion has 
arisen across the EP and Council around the core belief of promoting a ‘space to think’ (Hillebrandt 
and Novak 2016). Both EP and Council actors refer to this belief extensively. Both describe this 
‘space to think’ as an alternative to: 1) grandstanding on the one hand; and 2) the descent into 
informal politics on the other hand. ‘Space to think’ means that compromises are difficult to 
achieve when the cameras are on. Both legislators highlight the temporal dynamics of compromise-
crafting: compromises develop over time, requiring different concessions from different actors.  
This is not a linear or symmetric process. While the overall result may be balanced, it builds on a 
series of partial touchstone agreements, which might seem unbalanced if they were publicized in 
real time. Public pressure would thus stiffen positions, making it very difficult to move forward 
towards a compromise. Both EP and Council actors highlight two different types of pressures 
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arising from the ‘public gaze’. One pressure is clearly identifiable. It is related to the power of 
vested interests: more transparency give powerful interests more influence especially if the political 
process is skewed in the first place, according to both EP and Council legislators. Another pressure 
is more diffuse and less clearly identifiable. It is the pressure of ‘public opnion’: more transparency 
means more public messaging and public relations work (grandstanding, face-saving, and 
posturing) aimed at placating public opinion rather than solving specific problems.  
Second, important differences exist below the surface. We note the importance of efficiency 
as a prominent value in the Council, as expressed in the belief that trilogues are a superior form of 
‘conciliation’. EP actors may value efficiency, but they do not articulate it, which indicates a lesser 
prominence than in the Council. More importantly, we note the basic and fundamental contradiction 
between a Council viewing trilogues as a neutralizing and depoliticizing device and an EP intent to 
use trilogues to project its power and politicize EU legislation. There are several ways in which 
trilogues are believed to depoliticize negotiations: 1) by creating asymmetries of information: as a 
‘discrete’ and ‘secretive’ Council can control an open, attention-craving, and talkative EP; 2) as a 
result, by enabling Council to fragment EP opposition by dividing and ruling strategies; and finally, 
3) by enabling Council to exchange symbolic political points against mastery and domination 
through technical arrangements.   
 In the EP, by contrast, trilogues have very much become synonymous with empowerment. 
There are many aspects of empowerment. For the large EP parties, empowerment means sitting at 
the table with the big boys (35). For the smaller parties, empowerment means reducing the 
domination of larger EP groups. The alternative to trilogues is an informal politics of ‘deals’ 
between Council and the large groups. For the EP as a whole, trilogues as a process and a 
construction helps forge and designate Council as a collective opponent. EP actors clearly perceive 
and articulate this effect as a political advantage. This explains the sense of ownership that many 
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MEPs have developed for a practice which could at first glance appear foreign to the political 
repertoire of parliamentary politics. 
In sum, a consensus exists across Council and the EP in support of trilogues. This consensus 
is centered on the belief that trilogues afford lawmakers the ‘space to think’ which is necessary for 
crafting complex compromises in a political environment characterized by often polarized opinion 
and skewed political interests. This consensus institutionalizes a basic contradiction, between an EP 
intent on politicizing EU lawmaking at the heart of power, and Council viewing trilogues as a tool 
of conflict deflection and legislative efficiency. This consensus,  forms the ‘tradition’ within which 
trilogues are validated as an appropriate form of decision-making.  
 
Seclusion dilemmas: the cost and limits of tradition 
The tradition of seclusion has not gone unchallenged. Pockets of opposition exist, which are 
nurtured by ideological opposition and ambiguous lessons from MEPs’ lived experiences. In the 
EP, much of the contestation about trilogues has developed on ideological grounds. Trilogues were 
from the outset a controversial topic, and the fire is smouldering under the lid of EP empowerment. 
The radical left party GUE/NGL (Confederal Group of the European United Left/Nordic Green 
Left) has long expressed its opposition to a system that it deemed untransparent, and it continues to 
do today. For instance, at the time of writing GUE/NGL MEPs on the ECON committee 
systematically opposed any committee decision to enter into trilogue negotiations on the ground of 
transparency and accountability (Interview 31). Given GUE/NGL’s confederal structure, this 
decision was not applied across all EP committees; it nonetheless suggests that EP reform of 
trilogues remains an unfinished business. In the Greens, an MEP raised the lack of transparency of 
the EP’s preparatory bodies as a problematic issue, referring to the untransparent role of the 
shadows’ meetings in the process of elaboration of the EP trilogue mandate (Interview 15). The rise 
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of Euroskeptical parties adds yet new voices of discontent as these parties are often excluded from 
the trilogue process (Interview 26). Recent research shows that ‘only soft Eurosceptics are seen as 
legitimate partners in intra-institutional negotiations, while mainstream MEPs exclude hard 
Eurosceptics from trilogue negotiations in order not to give them a platform to propagate their 
views’ (Ripoll Servent and Panning, 2019).  
In addition to ideological tensions, tradition is also challenged on the ground of EP 
empowerment. A sticking point for the EP is to maintain access to high-quality advice and expertise 
under the trilogue process. The EP has developed considerable in-house resources, with significant 
growth in staff for the European Parliament Research Service (EPRS), the Directorate General for 
Interal Policies (DGIPol), Secretariat staff of committees, and assistants for MEPs (Greenwood and 
Roederer-Rynning 2019). And at least one member state reported facing a technically superior EP 
team (Interview 12). However, a widespread experience is that Council exploits the EP’s relative 
technical weakness by shifting issues into ‘technical’ trilogues (Interview 15). One member state 
contrasted Council’s independence from external sources of technical input in trilogues, with EP 
dependence on external advice and expertise (from NGOs) (Interview 2). Some member states 
viewed the EP’s relative lack of expertise as leading it to concede many points of ‘technical’ details 
and reinforcing its eagerness to score ‘political’ points (Interviews 10, 11). Thus, in addition to 
ideological tensions and political exclusion, the lived experience of some lawmakers clashes with 
the belief of empowerment, bringing the tradition of trilogue seclusion under pressure. 
The tradition of seclusion has faced its own dilemmas in the Council. One dilemma focuses 
on the trade-off between efficiency and Council power. Some member states view the EP as the big 
winner of trilogues and threaten to go back to the Treaty framework if the EP becomes too difficult-
-this is clearly based on a belief that the formal rules of EU lawmaking would be advantageous to 
Council  (Interview 1). Sometimes, member states also experience that Council makes too large 
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concessions to the EP, or concessions they did not fully understand, in its eagerness to compromise 
(Interview 12). Finally, speed can also be detrimental to the quality of legislation (Interview 2). 
Sometimes, speed is just not that attractive.  
An equally important dilemma revolves around the decreasing internal transparency that some 
experience in the Council. Member states regularly described the Presidency as the only ‘insider’ in 
trilogues, being the only member state participating in the trilogues. While presidencies are widely 
aware that their power depends to a large extent on the trust that Member States place in them 
(Interview 7; Interview 29), many member states highlighted the difficulty of keeping track of the 
negotiations. The Presidency often keeps member states informed through oral debriefings of very 
short duration and uninformative nature. The presence of the Commission sometimes constrained 
the reporting (Interview 1). No minutes are circulated, although the secretariat keeps minutes 
(which it does not circulate) and some working groups might circulate ‘outcomes of proceedings’ 
(Interview 3). Sometimes papers with procedural content may be circulated, but they remain of little 
interest. It is therefore up to the member states to keep track of the process--a difficult task 
considering the need to monitor 27 positions and complex details. Compounding the difficulty is the 
fact that the traditional system of footnote annotations, by which member state positions are 
recorded in internal documents, is not used across the board in the Council (Interviews 3, 7, 10, 11, 
12). This makes it even more difficult for member states to track one another’s positions in the 
negotiations. As a result, member states report having difficulty reading the political landscape and 
the thrust of coalition-building in the Council (Interview 3), and there is a certain sense of unease 
vis-à-vis the asymmetric position of the Presidency. One member state, for example, described the 
Presidency as not always reporting what really happened in trilogues and playing with votes behind 
the scenes (Interview 9). All member states acknowledge the need to rely on multiple sources of 
information to stitch together their understanding of the trilogue process and coalition opportunities.  
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Practices of seclusion: The permeability of trilogues 
Institutionalized contradictions and dilemmas arising from ideological trade-offs and the lived 
experiences of EU lawmakers have fueled a constant flow of exchanges across the boundaries of 
trilogues. Trilogues are not sealed off; they are permeable. Permeability has two dimensions. A first 
dimension is inter-institutional: it brings in contact institutional actors at both EU and national 
levels. The Commission is regularly mentioned as a key source of information. EP and Council 
interviewees also provide ample evidence of ongoing contacts across the two institutions. Member 
states often consider MEPs from their countries as ‘their’ MEPs, though there might be national 
variation regarding the density of contacts between Perm Reps and national MEPs (contrast 
interviews 5 and 6). In turn, MEPs are often dependent on their Perm Reps for accessing trilogue 
documents (Interview 26). National governments and parliaments play a role too, in this circulation 
of information (Interviews 2, 4, 5,6).  
A second layer of contacts spanned the institutional - extrainstitutional domains. This layer of 
contacts involved all institutional actors. Some member states claimed relying only or mostly on 
inter-institutional contacts (Interview 2 and 6). But they too were open to societal actors, stressing 
the gap between Council’s self-understanding as an institution which does not leak (Interview 2) 
and the entrenched practice of open door policy and information exchange between Perm Reps and 
their societal environments. At least six patterns of disclosure, and their associated justifications, 
emerged:  
1. expertise sharing was about acquiring technical knowledge necessary for EU 
legislation. This deviation from seclusion was seen as appropriate when lawmakers 
did not have the relevant expertise in house to address the highly detailed and complex 
nature of legislation at the supranational level. Trilogues did not mark the end of the 
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need for expertise; in fact, the acceleration of the negotiations during trilogues 
highlighted the need for insiders to get swift and reliable access to expertise, 
sometimes to be provided overnight (Interview 82). The EP was conventionally 
viewed as being more in need of external input on technical issues, although this 
assertion was occasionally disputed from outside observers (Interviews 5 and 64). The 
‘Noise at Work’directive was a good example of this, where you needed input from 
outside organizations about what different decibel levels meant (Interview 15).  
2. intelligence gathering: was about understanding the processual side of EU lawmaking, 
specifically how the ‘lay of the land’ evolved during trilogues, in an environment 
often very difficult to ‘read’. All types of CSOs could be involved. Consultancies were 
sometimes singled out as a good source of information (Interview 5 and 27). Besides 
monitoring the position of other actors, intelligence gathering during trilogues also 
involved shaping one’s own position. Occasionally, EP or Council actors had not 
worked out their strategy and used intelligence gathering to develop their last minute 
game plan (Interview 44). 
3. inter- and intra-institutional lobbying: was about building coalitions, usually across 
the EP and Council, and often (but not always) indirectly, i.e., with an outsider as an 
intermediary. Sometimes, the EP encouraged NGOs or producer associations to lobby 
the member states (Interviews 56, 60, 68, and 74). Other times, some member states 
might do the same, either to influence the EP or other member states (Interview 1, 8, 
66). For member states, this type of lobbying was appropriate when national interests 
were at stake. Most stressed the hold of the ‘no naming and shaming’ norm. Finally, 
sometimes, it was the Commission, which was trying to build support for its proposal 
with the lawmakers, using civil society organizations (Interviews 67, 76, and 77).  
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4. politicization: was about breaking trilogue negotiations out to the broader public, 
either directly through leaks, or indirectly through civil society organizations 
(typically NGOs) as an intermediary. For an EP interviewee, reaching out to NGOs to 
create public pressure was appropriate when other means of leverage were not 
available. If they could obtain information at the right time and in a way that would 
capture media attention, then an NGO could make a difference, and it would even be 
possible to embarrass the Presidency (Interview 35). Politico was repeatedly cited as 
an important source of leakage, perhaps a game-changer in this respect, creating a 
tremendous amount of frustration with some member states but welcomed by others (a 
contrast between interviews 1 and 6, vs 4).  
5. domestic provisions on parliamentary scrutiny: depending on the domestic procedures 
for parliamentary control of EU affairs, national parliaments were more or less well-
informed of the ongoing trilogues negotiations, with the Dutch, German, and Danish 
parliaments better informed. Some information on trilogues was occasionally leaked 
out to the broader public via national parliaments. Other times, the information 
circulating between Perm Reps and their capital was considered legally subject to all 
transparency requirements in domestic law.  
6. normative pressure: on some files, it was simply not normatively defensible not to 
inform the broader public about the national positions. The ‘Trade Secrets’ file was 
one such file, on which member states experienced that they were morally compelled--
due to the nature of the topic--to break out of the secrecy bubble of the trilogues.  
As a result, both the industry and NGOs are very well-informed, sometimes better informed!, 
than institutional actors (interview 5). At least one NGO reported almost negotiating on behalf of 
the negotiators (interview 50). The EP is regularly portrayed as a very open (the most open – but 
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see Settembri 2005) institution. MEPs often have ‘their’ team of CSO advisors (Interview 15) ,who 
provide them with advice and expertise during the trilogue process (Interview 28). All EP 
interviewees claimed having regular contacts with a broad and pluralistic set of societal and 
institutional interests during trilogues.  
In sum, trilogues in practice take place in a very dense web of ongoing contacts between 
institutional actors and societal actors.  These contacts take place through very different channels 
and methods; and they are initiated for a variety of reasons ranging from the need for expertise to 
references to the national interest through normative reasons.   
 
CONCLUSION 
The EU institutions have not yet responded to the European Ombudsman’s report, and a request for 
clarification of the ruling is now pending (interview 79). Yet, clearly the Ombudsman’s 2016 report 
and the Court’s 2018 ruling can change the trilogue process, paving the way for more systematic 
and public access to trilogue information. While concrete implications are currently being worked 
out in EU institutions, our study generates original and systematic insights into the reasons why EU 
lawmaking has taken the form of secluded decision-making (trilogues), and how trilogue practices 
have evolved to a point where it makes better sense to talk about the permeability, rather than the 
seclusion, of trilogues.  
We have argued the following. In line with the EU’s hybrid political nature, the EU 
lawmaking process can be interpreted as politicized diplomacy, i.e., a hybrid and unstable fusion 
between: an intergovernmental paradigm of politics, emphasizing negotiation between sovereign 
representatives and promoting the quiet and consensual method as a mechanism of conflict 
resolution; and a parliamentary paradigm, emphasizing competition between elected 
representatives, and open and public debates as a mechanism of conflict resolution. The trilogue 
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process, with seclusion as its defining feature, is a compromise between these traditions, and to 
some extent it reflects the crafting of a new, albeit unstable, tradition, forming together around the 
shared belief of the need to create a ‘space to think’. This new tradition has not gone unchallenged. 
Ongoing ideological rumblings and the ambiguous lessons of lawmakers’ lived experiences have 
raised dilemmas in both the EP and Council. These dilemmas are the primary reason why a steady 
flow of exchanges exists between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ during trilogues, in spite of 
commitments from EP and Council actors to protect the ‘space to think’.  We have thus come full 
circle: from treaty declarations of the EU lawmaking process as open and public, to trilogue 
seclusion and trilogue permeability, and now also to renewed, authoritative public calls for an open 
and public process.. 
Our contribution is threefold. First, regarding the trilogue literature, our study coins the 
concept of ‘politicized diplomacy’ to make sense of trilogues, as an institution unsteadily poised 
between the diplomatic and the parliamentary traditions, and evolving as a result of ongoing 
tensions between different sets of beliefs and real-world dilemmas encountered by EU policy-
makers. This is a distinctive contribution given the predominant interpretation of trilogues as a 
depoliticizing device. We know that ‘when a policy decision point approaches, but clashes between 
rival advocacy coalitions cause impasse, the EU’s natural propensity is to depoliticize issues and 
“push” them back to the sub-systematic level for quiet resolution’ (Peterson 2001, 309). While 
Peterson had expert committees and professional networks in mind, trilogues also lend themselves 
perfectly well, in appearance, to defusing political conflict in a quiet and largely technical context. 
In this article, we argue that understanding trilogues as a depoliticizing device, however, is too 
simple because this overlooks the intrinsic conflicts upon which trilogues are based and which keep 
flaring up. At bottom, trilogues are based upon a clash between the diplomatic and the 
parliamentary traditions; this clash remains an living fault line, fuelling tensions and contradictions. 
 
 23 
Where Council hoped to shape trilogues in conformity with its own working method, it has been 
faced with MEPs viewing trilogues as, in essence, a tool of bicameral conflict resolution--an 
opportunity to bring politics to the heart of the EU legislative process.  
Second, in making this argument, we contribute to the emerging scholarly focus on the 
politicization of the EU (De Wilde and Zürn 2012; De Wilde et al. 2016). While this literature has 
mainly focused on the citizen and intermediary spheres (Baglioni and Hurrelmann 2016), we show 
how insiders politicize trilogues by negotiating under the shadow of public opinion, and bringing 
salient issues for a broad range of societal interests to the very heart of legislative deals. Our 
contribution in this regard is to trace the dense and variegated pattern of exchanges between trilogue 
insiders and a very broad range of civil society organizations. This punctures the myth of trilogues 
as quiet politics dominated by producer interests.  
Third, with regard to the interpretivist literature in EU studies, our work shows the relevance 
of interpretivism to explore EU informal governance and politicization of the EU (Wiesner et al. 
2017), and particularly, the fruitfulness of explanatory concepts like ‘traditions’, ‘dilemmas’, and 
‘narratives’. At the same time, our methodological approach to ‘soaking and poking’ provides 
concrete solutions to classic problems that researchers face when dealing with informal processes 
and relying on (a large number of) qualitative interviews.  
Looking ahead, we need to explore how civil society organizations engage with trilogues, and 
what implication this has on their identities, mobilization strategies, organizational form and 
resource management. Furthermore, given the hybrid character of trilogues as politiced diplomacy, 
we need to pursue and deepen the normative reflection on trilogues (Stie 2013; Reh 2014) to assess 
the conditions under which we can accept lawmakers’ own justifications of (dis)closure, evidenced 
in this paper, as acceptable. Where do we draw the line between ‘making formal rules work in 
practice’ and ‘anything goes’? 
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All interviews conducted in Brussels unless otherwise indicated 
 
Interview 1 with the permanent representation of a large member state, 25.09.2017 
Interview 2 with the permanent representation of a large member state, 10.01.2018 
Interview 3 with the permanent representation of a medium-sized member state, 25.9.2017 
Interview 4 with the permanent representation of a medium-sized member state, 26.9.2017 
Interview 5 with the permanent representation of a medium-sized member state, 28.9.2017 
Interview 6 with the permanent representation of a medium-sized member state, 28.9.2017 
Interview 7 with the permanent representation of a medium-sized member state, 28.9.2017 
Interview 8 with the permanent representation of a medium-sized member state, 29.9.2017 
Interview 9 with the permanent representation of a medium-sized member state, 12.10.2017 
Interview 10 with the permanent representation of a small member state, 26.9.2017 
Interview 11 with the permanent representation of a medium-sized member state, 29.9.2017 
Interview 12 with the permanent representation of a small member state, 29.9.2017 
Interview 14 with an MEP from the EPP, Strasbourg, 14.9.2017 
Interview 15 with an MEP from the Greens, 28.9.2017 
Interview 16 with an MEP from ALDE, 10.10.2017 
Interview 17 with an MEP from ALDE, 12.10.2017 
Interview 18 with an MEP from S&D, 5.12.2017 
Interview 21 with an MEP from ECR, 6.12.2017 
Interview 22 with an MEP from GUE/NGL, 6.12.2017 
Interview 24 with an MEP from ECR, 9.4.2018 
Interview 26 with a policy advisor from the S&D, Strasbourg, 13.9.17 
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Interview 27 with a policy advisor from ALDE, Srasbourg, 13.9.2017 
Interview 28 with a policy advisor from the ECR, 26.9.2017 
Interview 29 with a party policy advisor, ALDE, 29,9,2017 
Interview 31 with a party policy advisor, GUE/NGL, 12.10.2017 
Interview 35 with a party policy advisor, Greens-EFA, 7.12.2017 
Interview 39 with an assistant to an S&D MEP, 13.2.2018 
Interview 43 with an NGO, 25.9.2017 
Interview 44 with an NGO, 25.9.2017 
Interview 50 with an NGO, 29.9.2017 
Interview 56 with an NGO, 17.1.2018 
Interview 60 with a national trade union confederation, 6.12.2017 
Interview 64 with a business association, 27.2.2018 
Interview 66 with a business association, 4.6.2018 
Interview 68 with a business association, 5.6.2018 
Interview 74 wih a business association, 7.6.2018 
Interview 76 with a business association, 7.6.2018 
Interview 77 with a business association, 7.6.2018 
Interview 79 with a national business association, 8.6.2018 
 
 
Key to party acronyms: 
ALDE Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe 
ECR European Conservative and Reformists Group 
EPP European People’s Party 
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Greens-EFA Greens – European Free Alliance 
GUE/NGL European United Left/Nordic Green Left 
S&D Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats 
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METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX 
Interviewee selection and access 
A division was made between trilogue ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’.  ‘Insiders were those who 
participated in trilogues, or who were involved in institutional preparation for trilogues, whereas 
outsiders were those who had no official access to the trilogue process. As Schwartz-Shea and 
Yanow (2012, 70) write, ‘the language of “case selection” [used by positivist researchers] implies 
considerable researcher control … but is not appropriate to interpretive research design’, which is 
why interpretivists prefer to speak of access rather than case selection. Of the outsiders, only two 
organisations refused to meet with us, or could not be reached.  Of the insiders, almost half of the 
permanent representations responded positively to an invitation to interview, with only one outright 
refusal.  Most of the remainder later responded positively to a subsequent research enquiry.  This is 
notable, because traditionally permanent representations have been hard to reach in research 
enquiries.  There was slightly less success in gaining interviews with MEPs, with many proving 
hard to reach.  Nonetheless, there was the previous enquiry to draw upon where necessary. 
Insiders:All the Permanent Representations were contacted, with the responses enabling 
interviews with a range of large, medium and small countries. In the European Parliament, the input 
of a spread of parties and committees were sought where there was recent experience with trilogues, 
in selecting interviewees from amongst MEPs.  Two assistants substituted where appointments with 
Members had to be cancelled, but these were individuals with active experience of working on a 
recent trilogue file.  Two members of the EP Secretariat were interviewed, who were well placed to 
comment on a case-study of the trilogue process.  A previous project, in which trilogues had formed 
one line of enquiry, had involved interviewing a much wider range of MEPs.  
Outsiders:All organisations contributing to the European Ombudsman’s public consultations 
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on trilogues were invited for interview.  The remaining ‘outsider’ organisations were selected from 
the EU transparency register, so as to achieve a spread of perspectives from the range of civil 
society organisations present in Brussels, using the criteria of small, medium sized and large 
organisations. A future study could include companies with offices based in Brussels, and national 
associations with offices in and outside of Brussels, in order to develop the line of enquiry that a 
Brussels base provides for access to information about the trilogue process.  Nonetheless, we 
managed to interview three national organisations with a Brussels office; a producer association, a 
trade union, and an NGO. 
 
Process of data reduction and analysis 
The process of data reduction and analysis involved the following complementary steps: a) 
writing up reports by category of interviewees, in order to extract the most significant points, 
convergences as well as contradictions; these reports helped us identify relevant classification 
categories, to be used in a more systematic analysis of the data. Originally 27 codes were identified; 
b) we then wrote up more detailed individual interview reports (called case reconstructions) citing 
for each category, the key passage of the interview minutes; and c) finally, we created a searchable 
interview database in Excel, on the basis of these individual reports and finer coding dimensions, 
which enabled us to filter relevant parts of the interview material across analytical dimensions. 
 
Guide to individual interview detailed reporting (case reconstructions) 
This document regroups all the individual case reconstructions, which have been uploaded 
individually to the folders on Sharepoint. In cases where there were two sets of notes, only one case 
reconstruction was done, with both sets used therein. Quotes from the notes, when relevant, have 
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been entered under different coding dimensions. These dimensions are explained below in detail. 
Interviewees, references to other interview subjects, specific – e.g. sectoral – organisations 
connected to the interview subject, opinions attributed to other persons etc. have been 
anonymised. Whenever an interview subject refers to another one in the notes, this is referenced 
by case reconstruction ID number and actor code. The acronyms used for the actor codes are noted 
subsequent to the coding dimensions. References include cases where the quote in the notes has 
not been judged relevant enough to be included in the case reconstructions. Between the coding 
dimensions linked to a quote in the summary and the categorisation in the case 
reconstruction, there might be differences as the context of the full interviews can have induced a 
change. The summary document has not been updated as it has been considered a temporary 
working base as regards the links between quotes and categories therein. 
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Table 1 - Four types of trilogue-related sources of opacity of the EU lawmaking process 
Source of opacity Description of the effect 
Design of 
trilogues 
There is no or little public information about the calendar of trilogues 
meetings, no official and publicly available minutes, and the famous four-
column documents--i.e., the document that trilogue negotiators work on, 
where the first three columns identify the position of each three institutions, 
and a blank fourth column is filled out during the process to reflect the 
inter-institutional agreement reached in the trilogue meetings--remain for 
the most part unpublished (European Ombudsman 2016). 
Preparatory 
bodies 
There is a lack of transparency around the work of the preparatory bodies 
of trilogues in the EP (Settembri 2005; Stie 2013; Ripoll Servent 2017), in 
the Council (Stasavage 2004; Settembri 2005; Berthier 2016), or in the 
Commission (Panning 2019 ). 
Composition 
effect 
 
There is an unfortunate composition effect due to the superposition of 
trilogues and early agreements (first-reading agreements in particular). This 
combination allows EU legislators to eschew the core transparency 
obligations linked to public deliberations on first-reading positions in the 
EP and common positions in the Council (Berthier 2016). 
Implementation of 
‘access to 
documents’ 
There is a regulatory gap on ‘access to documents’ at the EU level 
(Settembri 2005), particularly as it pertains to the trilogue process: the 
regulatory framework is outdated and does not take into account the reality 
of trilogue lawmaking; agreement on revising it has been long stalled due 
to diverging national views in the Council; in the absence of a reform, the 
regime has been left to the discretionary purview of EU institutions, which 
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have adopted a minimalist interpretation of access in relation to trilogue 
proceedings (Curtin and Leino 2017; Leino 2017). 
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Table 2: Interviewees 
 
Trilogue insiders Trilogue outsiders 
Permanent 
Representations 
Large countries  
Medium countries 
Small countries 
12 
 
2 
7 
3 
Civil Society Organisations* 
NGOs 
Trade Unions 
Producer Associations 
38 
16(15)  
2 (1) 
20 
(19) 
European Parliament: 
MEPs (5 parties, 7 
committees) 
Party Advisors (same 
affiliations as MEPs) 
Assistants to MEPs 
Secretariat 
30 
13 
 
11 
 
4 
2 
Other 
Public Affairs Consultancies 
Speakers at trilogue 
conferences 
European Ombudsman’s 
office 
Territorial governmental 
representative organisation 
7 
3 
2 
 
1 
 
1 
Total 42  44 
* In parenthesis: figure of Civil Society Organizations at EU level.   
  
 
 38 
Figure 1: Council and EP beliefs on trilogues 
 
 
  
 
Source: Own interviews. Numbers in parentheses refer to interview identification number. 
 
 
COUNCIL BELIEFS 
1.Efficiency: Trilogues as super ‘conciliation’ 
Commission committed to trilogues (1)  
Presidency rushes the member states (9) 
Presidency can speed up process, e.g. by initiating  
talks with the EP prior to the mandate (7; 10) 
Presidency takes pride in concluding a file (9) 
  
2.Depoliticization: Trilogues as EP-neutralizer 
Views of EP 
EP as public attention-seeker (1; 3; 4; 11) 
EP as self-proclaimed spokesperson for citizen issues 
and using access-to-documents provisions (8) 
            Depoliticizing tactics:  
Splits: ‘dividing the EP team and rule’ (11) 
Secrecy: ‘not showing Council’s cards’ (3;12) 
Discretion: ‘no naming and shaming’ (1;3; 4;8;10;12) 
Concessions: of political points for technical wins (11) 
But: has depoliticization reached its limits? 
COMMON GROUND: 
‘SPACE TO THINK’ 
EP BELIEFS 
1.COUNCIL reasoning 
Grandstanding, face-saving, and posturing  
when cameras are on (2; 5; 6; 7) 
No point in publicizing documents that do not reflect  
fully worked out compromises (2;5) 
More transparency would skew process  
towards powerful interests (6) 
2.EP reasoning 
More transparency means more lobbying (18; 24) 
More transparency = more messaging (17; 24) 
Transparency only gives snapshots of negotiations 
 -- undesirable for complex problems (21) 
Is there an alternative? (18; 22) 
1.Empowerment: Sitting at the table  
is better than being outside 
 Views of what’s in it for different EP actors 
Participating in trilogues increases power (60; 35) 
 Large parties: A game of ‘bluff and ‘double bluff’ (21) 
 Large parties: A ‘Disneyland adventure’ (14) 
 Smaller parties: we sit at the table too; this mitigates  
 the power of large EP groups (15,16,17, and 21) 
 EP as a whole: the opponent becomes Council  
 -- not other EP groups (15,16,17, and 21) 
But: empowerment at cost of transparency?  
2. Empowerment tactics 
 
            Helping Presidency bring a matter to vote in Council (15) 
            Tying up with organized interests (14, 15, 23, 26, 28, 30) 
            Using media to influence Council  (18, 21, 23, 24, 31, 35) 
